Here is my CV.
Peer Reviewed Publications
Electoral Accountability and State Violence: The Political Legacy of the Marikana Massacre (with Daniel de Kadt and Melissa Sands) [pdf] Conditionally accepted at APSR
Abstract: Democratic states often wield coercive force against ordinary people, yet little is known about the electoral consequences of such violence in the communities directly effected. Using geo-coded polling station data and a difference-in-differences design that leverages temporal and spatial variation, we analyze how incumbent electoral support was affected by South Africa's Marikana massacre, one of the most high-profile examples of state violence in contemporary democratic Africa. We find evidence that in the communities directly affected by the massacre the incumbent party was dramatically punished at the polls. Using geo-referenced survey data to investigate the sources of this change, we find that our results are almost exclusively driven by voters switching to an opposition party that formed in the wake of the massacre, rather than (de-)mobilization. We also find, contrary to some academic and popular narratives, no evidence of attitudinal shifts around institutional trust or views of democracy and participation.
Working Papers
Colonial Legacies in State Building: Ethnicity and Bureaucratic Representation in Nigeria [pdf]
A large body of scholarship suggests that group representation in the bureaucracy has important consequences for distributive politics. But why do some ethnic groups in contemporary Africa have better bureaucratic representation than do others? Using data on bureaucratic personnel spanning a century, I trace how the Nigerian Federal Civil Service -- the country’s national bureaucracy -- emerged from the colonial state building process. I argue that ethnic groups with greater exposure to colonial education gained early entry into the colonial civil service. These first entrants were subsequently more likely to be highly represented in the civil service over all the years studied. I theorize that this persistence in representation in the civil service is due to first entrants maintaining their representational advantage by hiring their co-ethnics. The findings demonstrate how ethnic groups which gained early access to the bureaucracy shaped the process of state building to their own advantage over the long run, with important consequences for distributive politics, and political development.
Precolonial States and Development: Evidence from Agriculture in Africa (with Aditya Dasgupta) [pdf]
Abstract: Low agricultural productivity is a major source of poverty in Africa, where much of the population works in agriculture, yet subsistence production and food insecurity are widespread. However, some pockets of agriculture in Africa are highly productive. In this paper, we assemble a geospatial dataset of all pre-colonial African states in existence between 1500 and 1850, and utilize remote-sensing data based on satellite imagery to show that areas (pixels) in proximity to the location of pre-colonial state capitals display higher levels of contemporary agricultural output. This relationship exists across and within countries, agro-ecological zones, and river basins. We rule out spurious correlation with spatial randomization tests. We argue that via path-dependence and spatial agglomeration effects, pre-colonial states transmitted the territorial reach that was critical for state-led agricultural modernization in the twentieth century. The findings support a growing literature linking contemporary economic development to state capacity transmitted from pre-colonial political institutions.
Subnational Authoritarianism in a Hybrid Regime: Evidence from Local Government Elections in Nigeria (with Nicholas Angelo Cruz) [pdf]
Abstract: We observe that national and state elections take place in Nigeria at regular intervals, but this is not the case for local government elections. Local government elections fall under the jurisdiction of state governors who may refuse to hold them. We explain why these subnational autocrats refuse to hold elections using existing explanations of why national autocrats allow elections. We find that subnational autocrats in Nigeria are more likely to refuse to hold local government elections where they do not face competition. In states where the governor is part of the majority group (political party, ethnic groups, or religious groups) they are more likely to refuse elections.
Peer Reviewed Publications
Electoral Accountability and State Violence: The Political Legacy of the Marikana Massacre (with Daniel de Kadt and Melissa Sands) [pdf] Conditionally accepted at APSR
Abstract: Democratic states often wield coercive force against ordinary people, yet little is known about the electoral consequences of such violence in the communities directly effected. Using geo-coded polling station data and a difference-in-differences design that leverages temporal and spatial variation, we analyze how incumbent electoral support was affected by South Africa's Marikana massacre, one of the most high-profile examples of state violence in contemporary democratic Africa. We find evidence that in the communities directly affected by the massacre the incumbent party was dramatically punished at the polls. Using geo-referenced survey data to investigate the sources of this change, we find that our results are almost exclusively driven by voters switching to an opposition party that formed in the wake of the massacre, rather than (de-)mobilization. We also find, contrary to some academic and popular narratives, no evidence of attitudinal shifts around institutional trust or views of democracy and participation.
Working Papers
Colonial Legacies in State Building: Ethnicity and Bureaucratic Representation in Nigeria [pdf]
A large body of scholarship suggests that group representation in the bureaucracy has important consequences for distributive politics. But why do some ethnic groups in contemporary Africa have better bureaucratic representation than do others? Using data on bureaucratic personnel spanning a century, I trace how the Nigerian Federal Civil Service -- the country’s national bureaucracy -- emerged from the colonial state building process. I argue that ethnic groups with greater exposure to colonial education gained early entry into the colonial civil service. These first entrants were subsequently more likely to be highly represented in the civil service over all the years studied. I theorize that this persistence in representation in the civil service is due to first entrants maintaining their representational advantage by hiring their co-ethnics. The findings demonstrate how ethnic groups which gained early access to the bureaucracy shaped the process of state building to their own advantage over the long run, with important consequences for distributive politics, and political development.
Precolonial States and Development: Evidence from Agriculture in Africa (with Aditya Dasgupta) [pdf]
Abstract: Low agricultural productivity is a major source of poverty in Africa, where much of the population works in agriculture, yet subsistence production and food insecurity are widespread. However, some pockets of agriculture in Africa are highly productive. In this paper, we assemble a geospatial dataset of all pre-colonial African states in existence between 1500 and 1850, and utilize remote-sensing data based on satellite imagery to show that areas (pixels) in proximity to the location of pre-colonial state capitals display higher levels of contemporary agricultural output. This relationship exists across and within countries, agro-ecological zones, and river basins. We rule out spurious correlation with spatial randomization tests. We argue that via path-dependence and spatial agglomeration effects, pre-colonial states transmitted the territorial reach that was critical for state-led agricultural modernization in the twentieth century. The findings support a growing literature linking contemporary economic development to state capacity transmitted from pre-colonial political institutions.
Subnational Authoritarianism in a Hybrid Regime: Evidence from Local Government Elections in Nigeria (with Nicholas Angelo Cruz) [pdf]
Abstract: We observe that national and state elections take place in Nigeria at regular intervals, but this is not the case for local government elections. Local government elections fall under the jurisdiction of state governors who may refuse to hold them. We explain why these subnational autocrats refuse to hold elections using existing explanations of why national autocrats allow elections. We find that subnational autocrats in Nigeria are more likely to refuse to hold local government elections where they do not face competition. In states where the governor is part of the majority group (political party, ethnic groups, or religious groups) they are more likely to refuse elections.